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 Abstract 
In this paper we study the quantitative properties of a policy reform aimed at funding the 
pension system in the standard model economy with perfect substitution across workers 
with different experience levels and a model economy where this substitutability is imperfect. 
With compulsory retirement, the welfare gains for young cohorts are underestimated in the 
standard model economy with perfect substitution as compared to the imperfect substitution 
case. However these additional welfare gains displayed in the imperfect substitution case 
come at the cost of higher welfare losses for the generations living at the time of the policy 
reform, due to the fall in the experience premium that follows after the elimination of social 
security. When the policy reform consists of the elimination of both social security and 
compulsory retirement, we find that in the standard model the status quo problem 
disappears. However, such policy change is not able to solve the status quo problem when 
less and more experienced workers are imperfect substitutes because the fall in the 
experience premium is more pronounced, providing a rationale for the lack of political 
support in favour of pension reform in the Spanish economy. 
 
JEL classification: E62, H55, J11. 
Keywords: Social Security, overlapping generations. 
 
1 Introduction
Despite the process of privatization of pension systems in some Latin American
countries (like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) that started in the
80s, most of the developed countries have not yet accomplished the reform of
their pay-as-you-go social security systems even when demographic projections
for the next 30 years predict a substantial increase in the number of retirees over
the working population. Motivated by this fact, researchers have investigated
the ways in which social security can be reformed without harming the welfare
of the majority of the population so that the status quo problem against the
pension reform is broken. Conesa and Garriga (2003) make a contribution in this
line of research in a model calibrated to the Spanish economy, whose population
is expected to be one of the oldest in the world by 2050. In particular, they
find that removing compulsory retirement as part of the elimination of social
security may increase the political support of pension reform in such way that
the percentage of the population that experiences welfare gains is higher than the
number of individuals with welfare losses, breaking up the status quo. The aim
of this paper is contribute to this debate by studying the aggregate implications
of imperfect substitution among workers with different experience levels. In
particular, I find that this feature changes in a quantitatively relevant way the
aggregate effects of such policy mix (elimination of both social security and
compulsory retirement) and the welfare of the generations living at the time of
the policy reform in such way that the status quo problem does not disappear
with the removal of compulsory retirement, providing a rationale for the lack of
pension reform observed across a number of developed countries.
This article is not new in addressing the effects of privatizing social security.
Some examples close in spirit to this paper are Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987),
Miles (1999) and Broer (1999). These papers are motivated by the potential
economic effects caused by the individuals that belong to the baby-boom gener-
ation as they enter retirement. In this sense, the recent research effort on social
security has mainly concentrated on the efficiency of the current pay-as-you-go
pension system (e.g. Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) and Boldrin et al. (1999) ), the
design of a feasible reform to a funded system (e.g. Conesa et al. (2000) and
Huang et al. (1996)) and the fiscal adjustments that prevents from privatization
(De Nardi et al. (1999) and Rojas (2005) for the Spanish economy). Most of
these studies are characterized by the perfect substitutability of workers with
different levels of work experience, namely they abstract from the possible effect
that a decrease in the labor supply of younger workers following a privatization
of the pension system could have on the relative labor earnings of older workers
at the time of the policy reform. In sharp contrast with this assumption, there
are many empirical studies (e.g. Borjas (2003), Macunovich (1999), Murphy
and Welch (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Freeman (1979), Welch (1979) and
Berger (1985)) that have found that the age-earnings profile of workers appears
to be significantly affected by the relative supply of workers with different years
of working experience. Despite the potential implications of this interaction for
a variety of macroeconomic issues, there are not many studies that have at-
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tempted to introduce these effects in macroeconomic models. Some exemptions
are the seminal work of Lam (1989) that studied the effects of changes in age
structure on life-cycle wage profiles in stable populations. In addition, Kremer
and Thomsom (1998) have studied the implications of the imperfect substitution
between young and old workers for the speed of convergence of per capita out-
put between countries and find that the existence of imperfect substitutability
creates a kind of adjustment cost in human capital because total output de-
pends positively on each generation generation’s human capital but negatively
on the change in human capital between generations. And more recently, Rojas
(2005) has shown that the effect of the aging of the baby-boom generation on
the expected increase in the share of GDP spent on pensions is less severe in
a model that accounts for cohort size effects than in one that abstracts from
them.
This paper contributes to the pension reform’s literature by comparing the quan-
titative properties of a policy reform aimed at funding the pension system in the
standard model economy with perfect substitution across workers with different
experience levels with a model economy where this substitutability is imper-
fect. Notice that with the phasing out of pensions, the social security tax rate
falls in response to the eliminated public pensions and as individuals save for
retirement through capital markets, the rate of return on capital falls. Both
mechanisms usually induce a reallocation of work effort over the life-cycle, sub-
stituting hours worked when young by hours worked when labor earnings peak.
In the standard model economy this process has no effects on the relative wage
rate of less and more experienced workers. However, in the model economy
which allows for imperfect substitution, this reallocation process decreases the
experience premium and imposes an additional cost (apart from the one caused
by the removal of pension benefits) in terms of a lower life-time earnings on
those agents that are in the years before retirement at the period of the policy
reform. The implications of this mechanism are as follows:
• With compulsory retirement, eliminating social security in the model econ-
omy with imperfect substitution induces a higher capital along the transi-
tion towards the new steady state. This higher stock of capital translates
into a higher output in the medium and long run. Consequently, the stan-
dard model economy with perfect substitution underestimates the positive
aggregate effects of reforming public pensions. In terms of the welfare
effects by generations, the welfare gains for young cohorts are underesti-
mated in the standard model economy with perfect substitution. However
these additional welfare gains displayed in the imperfect substitution case
come at the cost of higher welfare losses for the generations living at the
time of the policy reform, due to the fall in the experience premium that
follows after the elimination of social security.
• When the policy reform consists of the elimination of both social security
and compulsory retirement, it is found that in the standard model economy
with perfect substitution the status quo problem disappears, confirming
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the results of Conesa and Garriga (2003). However, such policy change is
not able to solve the status quo problem when less and more experienced
workers are imperfect substitutes in the production process because the
fall in the experience premium is even more pronounced. In fact, in this
case, the number of generations that suffers welfare losses stays unaffected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
economies I investigate. Section 3 describes how the model is parameterized to
be a realistic description of the Spanish economy in 1995. Section 4 presents
the main results of the paper and finally Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by agents that live a maximum of I periods. Each
model period corresponds to 5 years. Each agent is indexed by age i and time
t. Upon arrival at the age of IA (20 years old) an agent starts taking decisions.
Each individual is endowed with 1 unit of time that can be allocated to work or
leisure up to age IR−1 (at 65). After this age agents retire. Each agent faces an
age dependent probability of surviving between age i and age i+1 at t denoted
by si,t. Then the unconditional probability of reaching age i for an individual
that has age v at t is πiv,t =
∏i
k=v+1 sk−1,t+k−v−1 with π
v
v,t = 1. Let µi,t be the
share of age-i over the total population at time t. The population is stationary
and evolves according to,
µi+1,t+1 =
siµi,t
1 + nt
where nt is the population growth rate. Finally, the next period share of newly
born agents µ1,t+1 is given by
µ1,t+1 = 1−
I∑
i=2
µi,t+1. (1)
Agents reach adulthood at 20 and live up to age 95, after which death is cer-
tain. The initial steady state is characterized by the stationary age structure
of the population associated with the age survival probabilities in 1995 and a
population growth rate of zero.
2.2 Preferences
At each point in time agents are assumed to maximize lifetime utility. The
problem of the typical agent that at t has age i = v (v ≥ IA) is to choose
consumption and leisure li,t = 1− hi,t to solve the problem
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Max
IX
i=v
βi−vπiv,tU(ci,t+i−v, hi,t+i−v) (2)
subject to the following period-by-period constraint
ai+1,t+1 = (1 + rt(1− τk))ai,t + yi,t − ci,t (3)
with 0 ≤ ai+1,t+1, a1,t = 0, aI+1,t = 0. The discount parameter is β, and is
assumed to be the same for all agents. Borrowing is not possible and agents
accumulate asset holdings to smooth consumption over time. rt is the interest
rate net of depreciation, ai+1,t+1 denotes next period asset holdings, yi,t is labor
income net of taxes plus transfers and τk is a proportional capital income tax.
Let ei be the efficiency index, τss,t the social security proportional tax, τ l a
proportional labor income tax and di,t the social security benefits. Finally wi,t
denotes real wages per efficiency unit, that are indexed by age in order to account
for the imperfect substitution case, and Bt is the accidental bequest received at
t. These considerations allow us to define the labor income net of taxes plus
transfers as yi,t = wi,teihi,t(1 − τ l)(1 − τss,t) + di,t + Bt. The period utility
function is of the constant relative risk-aversion class
u(c, l) =
(cθl1−θ)1−σ
1− σ (4)
where the inverse of the elasticity of substitution σ and the share of consumption
θ has been set such that the average time spent working is around 1/3 and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is consistent with the empirical estimates
reviewed in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Hence we use σ = 2 and θ = 0.35.
The discount rate parameter is set equal to β = 0.986 so as to reproduce a private
capital-output ratio of 2.4 in the Spanish economy as reported by Conesa and
Garriga (2003).
2.3 Production Technology and Efficiency unit profile
Production in period t is given by a standard constant returns to scale produc-
tion function that converts capital Kt and labor Nt into output. The capital
share parameter is α = 0.375 following the estimates of Domenech and Taguas
(1995) for the Spanish economy. Hence,
Yt = F (Kt, Nt) = K
α
t Nt
1−α.
The depreciation parameter is set to match the average ratio of gross investment
over output I/Y=19%. This yields a value of δ = 8% in annual terms.
A decision concerning the aggregation of the labor input across different age
groups has to be made. The empirical studies of the effects of changes in the
5
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relative number of workers by age on age earnings profile have usually used the
constant elasticity of substitution form and the translogarithmic form. For our
purposes the CES functional form is very convenient because it has only one
elasticity of substitution across workers with different levels of work experience
(1/ρ) and it is flexible enough to account for the perfect substitutability case
(ρ = 0) and the imperfect substitutability model economy when ρ > 0.
An additional decision has to be made concerning the way in which indi-
viduals with different experience levels are sorted into different groups. Our
approach follows the standard practice in the labor literature that usually sorts
the population into two experience groups. I follow Borjas (2003) and measure
labor market experience by the difference between the age of a worker and the
age of entry into the labor market. Hence, the first group includes those indi-
viduals with less than 25 years of experience, i.e. those who are between 20 and
44 years old. The second group contains those individuals with age more than
45. This choice is also consistent with Murphy and Welch (1992) that although
considering 4 groups of ten years of experience, they find that those individuals
with less than 20 years of experience are substitutes among them, although they
are complements with those of more than 20 years of working experience. Given
these considerations, the aggregate labor input is
Nt = B(γL
1−ρ
t + (1− γ)H
1−ρ
t )
1
1−ρ (5)
where Lt and Ht are the labor supply in efficiency units of workers with less and
more than 25 years of working experience respectively, andB is a parameter that
measures the efficiency of aggregate labor. The procedure to set the values of the
inverse of the elasticity of substitution ρ, the parameter B, the share parameter
γ and the age-dependent efficiency units profile aims at reproducing the age
profile of hourly wages in the data. Moreover, the procedure is implemented in
such way that the age profile of hourly wages in the two model economies with
perfect and imperfect substitution between less and more experienced workers
{wi,tei} match the age profile of hourly wages of the data in the initial steady
state.
Hence, we first compute an age specific labor productivity profile ei using
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, 1994). This is done taking
the age specific profile of mean gross hourly wages for workers aged between
20 and 64 normalized by the sample average. Following Conesa and Garriga
(2003) in order to obtain the efficiency index of individuals above 65 years old,
a projection of this profile is used. Then in order to set the other parameters
we distinguish between two cases.
2.3.1 Perfect substitutability
In this model economy, a change in the relative supply of experienced workers
does not translate into changes in the relative wages on individuals by age.
6
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This is the case where ρ = 0. In addition, the value that governs the overall
efficiency of labor input is set to a normalized value of B = 1. Finally, the
value of the share parameter γ is set such that the age-profile of earnings in
the model economy which consists of a product of the market wage wi and the
efficiency index ei resembles the profile of earnings in the data. However, notice
that since by construction the age-specific profile of efficiency units ei already
captures this target, the share parameter γ has to be set such that whwl = 1.
Since the relative wage is given by
wh
wl
=
γ
1− γ
³H
L
´−ρ
(6)
then, when ρ = 0, whwl = 1 if γ = 0.5.
2.3.2 Imperfect substitutability
Murphy andWelch (1992), among others, have studied the existence of imperfect
substitutability among workers with different levels of experience and education.
Their estimates of the elasticities of complementarity imply values of the ρ
parameter between 0.5 and 2. In this paper we use ρ = 1.2 as our benchmark
case for the case of imperfect substitution. Finally, the share parameter γ is
set (as before) such that whwl = 1, yielding γ = 0.7311, and the parameter that
governs the overall efficiency of the labor input B is set so that the level of wages
per efficiency unit equals the level of wages per efficiency unit in the benchmark
model economy with perfect substitution between less and more experienced
workers, so that both model economies are identical in the initial steady state
allowing for a useful comparison in terms of the aggregate effects of pension
reform. This yields B = 0.9103.
2.4 Government
The government levies a proportional social security tax on labor income τ ss,t
to finance a benefit di,t per retiree. These benefits are computed applying a
replacement rate θ of 73.2% over the average earnings per worker in the economy,
di,t = θ
PIr−1
i=1 hi,twi,teiµiPIr−1
i=1 µi
and this system is assumed to be self-financed, i.e.
IR−1X
i=IA
µi,twi,thi,teiτss,t =
IX
i=IR
µi,tdi,t.
The social security tax rate that balances the pension budget is 26.30%. The
government also levies a proportional tax on capital τk and labor τ l income to
finance per capita government consumption Gt such that
7
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IX
i=IA
µi,t(rtai,tτk + wi,thi,tei(1− τss,t)τ l) = Gt.
In particular, we use a value of τk = 0.186 and τ l = 0.17 as reported by Bosca et
al. (1999). These values generate a government to output ratio of G/Y = 11.75
which is roughly consistent with the average of this number from 1970 to 1994
in Spain.
Table 1: Calibration
Parameters Targets
Preferences
θ=0.333 Average time working 1/3
σ=2 Kotlikoff ’s estimation
β=0.987 K/Y=2.4 Puch and Licandro (1997)
Efficiency Units and Technology
Efficiency index ei EHCP (1994)
λ = 1.5% Growth of p.c. consumption (1960-95)
α = 0.375 Domenech and Taguas (1995)
δ = 8% I/Y=19%
Perfect Substitution
ρ=0
γ=0.5 whwl = 1
B = 1
Imperfect Substitution
ρ=1.2 Katz and Murphy (1992)
γ=0.7311 whwl = 1
B = 0.9103 wh = wl=wage level in baseline model
Government
τk = 0.18, τ l = 0.17 Bosca, Fernandez and Taguas (1999)
Soc. sec. replacement rate=73.20% Average value in Spain
2.5 The Equilibrium
In this economy a Competitive Equilibrium is a list of sequences of quantities
ci,t, hi,t, ai,t, µi,t, Lt, Nt, Kt, prices wl,t, wh,t, rt, social security tax rates τ ss,t
and income tax rates such that, at each point in time t: 1) firms maximize
profits setting wages and the interest rate equal to marginal products, 2) agents
maximize lifetime utility subject to the period budget constraints taking as given
wages, the interest rate, taxes, social security benefits, survival probabilities, the
age structure of the population and accidental bequests, 3) the age structure of
the population {µi,t} follows the aggregate laws of motion explained earlier,
8
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4) accidental bequests are given by
Bt =
P
i µi−1,t−1ai,t(1− si−1,t−1)
(1 + nt−1)
PI
i=IA
µi,t
where nt−1 is the growth rate of the population between period t− 1 and t.
5) Market clearing conditions for capital and each type of labor holds,
Kt =
IX
i=IA
µi,tai,t
Ht =
IX
i=IE
µi,teihi,t
Lt =
IE−1X
i=IA
µi,teihi,t
where IE denotes the age of becoming an experienced worker. Finally, the
budget constraint of the government is satisfied period by period.
3 Findings
In this framework, I perform the same policy experiments as Conesa and Garriga
(2003) and are the following. The first is to set to zero the social security benefits
and taxes keeping untouched compulsory retirement at age 65 while adjusting
the labor income tax rate to balance the government budget, and the second
is to allow for endogenous retirement by allowing individuals above age 65 to
work. These experiments are presented in the standard model economy with
perfect substitution among workers with different experience levels, and another
model economy where this substitution is imperfect.
3.1 Pension Reform with Perfect Substitution
The long run effects of eliminating social security are in line with the findings of
previous studies (Conesa and Garriga (2003)). In particular, with the pension
reform, agents work harder due to the lower distortions associated with the
removal of social security taxes (see Table 3). As agents now save for retirement
through the capital markets, the capital stock increases by 28% inducing a
higher wage rate and a lower market return on capital. The increase in the
productivity of labor by 16%, the elimination of social security taxes and the
reduction in the labor income taxes induce an increase in after-tax wages of
63%. Labor supply, measured in efficiency units, also increases by 17% due to
the fact that agents work harder on average. In addition, there is a reallocation
of hours worked towards the early ages of the life-cycle (see Table 2). The
overall effect on the welfare (measured in consumption-equivalent variation) of
9
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an individual born in the new steady state is an increase in lifetime utility of
42%. The results when compulsory retirement is removed are slightly different.
As older individuals are allowed to work after age 65, labor supply increases
more importantly, and the need to save along the life-cycle for retirement is less
pronounced. Consequently, the capital stock increases to a lesser extent. The
overall effect, is an increase in output by 36.5% (because the increase in labor
supply compensates the less important increase in capital) and a slightly lower
welfare for new born in the new steady state. These results are quite similar to
the ones reported in Conesa et. al. (2003).
Table 2: Age distribution of labor supply. Perfect Substitution
PAYG FF+Comp. Ret FF+Endog. Ret.
Young 0.372 0.359 0.368
Old 0.205 0.348 0.245
Table 3: Steady-state Features of the model with Perfect Substitution
PAYG FF+Comp. Ret. FF+Endog. Ret.
Value % change Value % change
After-tax interest rate(%) 5.766 3.435 -40.440 4.639 -19.555
Gross wages unskilled 0.197 0.229 16.159 0.211 7.228
Gross wages skilled 0.197 0.229 16.159 0.211 7.228
After-tax wages unskilled 0.127 0.207 63.135 0.193 52.165
After-tax wages skilled 0.127 0.207 63.135 0.193 52.165
Labor supply 0.071 0.083 17.065 0.090 27.342
Average Hours(%) 30.787 35.502 15.316 33.482 8.755
K/Y ratio 2.320 2.978 28.361 2.607 12.338
G/Y ratio 11.748 8.640 -26.461 8.604 -26.765
Output 0.045 0.061 35.988 0.061 36.553
Labor tax(%) 17.000 9.754 -42.622 8.812 -48.166
Capital tax(%) 18.600 18.600 0.000 18.600 0.000
Social security tax(%) 22.580 0.000 -100.000 0.000 -100.000
Con. equival. variation(%) - 42.73 - 37.98 -
The transitional dynamics in both cases are displayed in Figure 1. It is worth
noting that in the model economy with endogenous retirement, the transition
towards the new steady state is faster. The lower increase in the capital stock
and the higher response of hours worked accounts for this different behavior.
Consequently, with a faster transition the benefits (through higher wages) gen-
erated by the reform materializes more quickly and, as it will be shown in the
next section, this will allow for a greater proportion of the population alive at
the period of the policy reform to attain a higher level of lifetime welfare.
10
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3.2 Pension Reform with Imperfect Substitution
The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5. With the elimination of social security,
as agents have perfect foresight, they take into account the general equilibrium
effect of a falling interest rate and react by intertemporally substituting future
consumption and leisure by present consumption and leisure early in life. This
means that there is a reallocation in the life time distribution of labor supply.
With funded pensions, young agents work less hours when young and more
hours when old being this process common to both model economies. In the
model economy with perfect substitution between less and more experienced
workers, this reallocation process of labor effort has no effect on the experience
premium which stays unaffected. However, if less and more experienced workers
are imperfect substitutes in production, as individuals born over the transition
work less when young and harder when old, the aggregate relative supply of
experienced workers increases over the initial periods of the transition and in
the long run. This process brings about a fall in the experience premium (see
Figure 2) and partially compensates the tendency to concentrate labor supply
in the last periods of the working life.
Table 4: Age distribution of labor supply. Imperfect Substitution
PAYG FF+Comp. Ret FF+Endog. Ret.
Young 0.372 0.384 0.395
Old 0.205 0.292 0.218
It is also worth noting that this process also induce individuals to accumulate
relatively more asset holdings over the early period of life and hence the capital
stock increases and the rate of return of capital falls relatively more in the
model economy with imperfect substitution. The fact that individuals save
relatively more in this model economy translates into a higher capital stock and
higher wages (a higher increase in the wage when young and a minor decrease
in the wage when old), and consequently the welfare of an individual born
in the new steady state is 5 % points higher than in the model economy with
perfect substitution and compulsory retirement. Again, this is so because young
individuals have the time to take advantage of the higher wages when young.
We will see that the long-run higher welfare levels for young generations come
at the cost of higher welfare losses of older individuals alive at the period of the
policy reform, since these individuals experience a fall in wages and do not live
enough to save for retirement.
The introduction of endogenous retirement as part of the pension reform only
moderate these effects and when those individuals above age 65 are allowed to
work, the experience premium suffers a further decline.
11
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Table 5: Steady-state Features of the model with Imperfect Substitu-
tion
PAYG FF+Comp. Ret. FF+Endog. Ret.
Value % change Value % change
After-tax interest rate(%) 5.766 2.561 -55.585 3.391 -41.195
Gross wages unskilled 0.197 0.269 36.425 0.262 32.647
Gross wages skilled 0.197 0.193 -2.050 0.169 -14.465
After-tax wages unskilled 0.127 0.242 90.716 0.237 86.790
After-tax wages skilled 0.127 0.173 36.930 0.153 20.448
Labor supply 0.071 0.080 12.843 0.084 18.997
Average Hours(%) 30.787 34.660 12.582 31.601 2.646
K/Y ratio 2.320 3.304 42.383 2.993 29.006
G/Y ratio 11.748 8.415 -28.373 8.466 -27.936
Output 0.045 0.062 39.496 0.062 38.649
Labor tax(%) 17.000 10.169 -40.180 9.513 -44.043
Capital tax(%) 18.600 18.600 0.000 18.600 0.000
Social security tax(%) 22.580 0.000 -100.000 0.000 -100.000
Con. equival. variation(%) - 47.66 - 46.60 -
3.3 Winners and Losers fromPension Reform and the Sta-
tus Quo
In order to compute the welfare effects of phasing out the pension system on the
generations living at the time of the policy reform, I follow the standard practice
which consists of calculating equivalent variations at birth for agents alive at
the period of the policy reform. The equivalent variation lists the negative of
the percentage that consumption must be increase or decrease by each period
over the lifetime of individuals so as they stay with the same utility as in the
initial steady state with the pay-as-you-go system untouched. Consequently,
the measure computed is positive if there is a welfare gain. The results are
shown in Table 6. In that Table, it is reported the welfare gain (loss) for each
generation with voting rights (those individuals aged 20-95) and the cumulative
frequency distribution of this voting population. Hence, it is straightforward
to see the percentage of the population that would vote in favour or against
the elimination of social security. The results of the experiment with perfect
substitution between less and more experienced workers confirms the results
found by Conesa et al. (2003). In particular with compulsory retirement, only
46% of the population enjoy welfare gains and consequently there exists the
so called status quo bias against the reform. In contrast, when compulsory
retirement is removed as part of the pension reform process, a majority of the
population (54.3%) would experience welfare gains and the status quo bias would
be broken. The reason is the shorter transition towards the steady state, which
means that the benefits of the reform materializes earlier in the form of higher
wages and consequently affects positively a higher number of individuals living
12
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in the initial period.
The most striking difference between the model with and without imperfect
substitution among experience levels concerns the welfare effect of reforming
public pensions for those generations that are alive when the policy change is
implemented. In particular, in the model economy with imperfect substitution
and compulsory retirement, the welfare gains of the young generations are higher
than in the standard economy with perfect substitution. For instance, those
aged 20-24, would enjoy 32% higher welfare as compared to the 29.4% with
perfect substitution, because the capital stock is higher. However, these welfare
gains for the younger generations come at the cost of higher welfare losses for the
older generations, mainly due to the decrease in the experience wage premium.
In summary, in the model with imperfect substitution, the elimination of social
security with compulsory retirement, would increase the welfare of the 37.6%
of the population as compared to the 46.1% of the standard model economy.
To what extent allowing for endogenous retirement would break this status quo
bias against the elimination of social security? The results are shown in the
last column of Table 4. Notice that although with endogenous retirement older
individuals are allowed to work, the change in the relative supply of experienced
workers induces a further fall in the wage premium. Consequently, in this case
endogenizing retirement not only would not break the status quo bias, but
in addition, the proportion of the population that experiences welfare gains
(37.6%) would remain unaffected.
Table 6: Welfare Effects of Eliminating Social Security
Perfect Subs. Imperfect Subs.
Cumulative
Age Freq. Distrib. FF+Comp. FF+Endog. FF+Comp. FF+Endog
voting popu.
20-24 0.099 0.294 0.277 0.320 0.339
25-29 0.195 0.195 0.193 0.192 0.213
30-34 0.287 0.111 0.125 0.089 0.114
35-39 0.376 0.046 0.070 0.012 0.036
40-44 0.461 0.002 0.030 -0.043 -0.023
45-49 0.543 -0.027 0.002 -0.084 -0.071
50-54 0.622 -0.046 -0.017 -0.085 -0.067
55-59 0.696 -0.059 -0.031 -0.084 -0.066
60-64 0.766 -0.072 -0.042 -0.088 -0.067
65-69 0.831 -0.112 -0.051 -0.117 -0.073
70-74 0.888 -0.077 -0.037 -0.080 -0.052
75-79 0.937 -0.052 -0.025 -0.054 -0.034
80-84 0.975 -0.035 -0.015 -0.036 -0.021
85-89 0.997 -0.024 -0.007 -0.025 -0.010
90-94 1.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has extended the standard large overlapping generations model to
allow for the interaction between changes in the relative labor supply of workers
with different experience levels and the lifecycle profile of earnings. It is found
that the macroeconomic and welfare effects of phasing out the current pay-as-
you-go pension system depends critically on the modelling strategy concerning
the complementarity between less and more experience workers. In particular,
the results indicate that a model that abstracts from this complementarity un-
derestimates the welfare losses of the agents living at the time of the policy
reform who are those that should vote for the implementation of such reform.
In addition, even when compulsory retirement is removed as part of the reform
of pensions, the status quo problem does not dissapear. Hence the results of
this paper go in the direction of explaining why the political support for this
policy change has shown to be weak in most of developed countries.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Effects of Pension Reform with Perfect Substitution
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Figure 2: Aggregate Effects of Pension Reform with Imperfect Substitution.
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